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Stagnation of Integration in Aid Administration in South Africa 
―Choices Between Norms, Interests and Power Balance―* 
 
Hisahiro Kondoh† 
 
Abstract 
Conventional literature, which analyzes potential factors to determine aid approaches, initially 
focused on donor interests rather than recipient needs. Recently, this analysis is being replaced 
with new understandings that emphasize the importance of identities and norms. Once aid 
actors internalize these concepts, these identities and norms can both help to determine 
approaches to aid. This paper argues that the intensity of both interests and identities/norms 
may differ between donors as well as within donors, and it can also take on a variety of roles at 
different times. Hence this paper focuses on the roles that both the interests and norms of 
stakeholders take in integrating aid administration. 
 
This paper analyses South Africa’s international aid approach, focusing on how and why the 
integration of its aid administration has stagnated. South Africa is not only a salient emerging 
aid donor individually but, at the regional level, is the only major donor on the African 
continent and, in a global sense, is the one member of BRICS from Africa. South Africa has 
been attempting to centralize and integrate its currently decentralized aid administration. 
Drawing on the sense of shared African identity fostered by the president, ruling party and 
foreign ministry, South Africa initially attempted to establish a centralized aid co-ordination 
mechanism—the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). However, the 
process of establishing SADPA has been stymied due to a number of factors: the change of 
president, corruption allegations against one president, the subsequent weakening of leadership, 
criticism by opposition parties, the economic recession and budget austerity, consistent 
economic interest in regional integration, and the indifference of the media and taxpayers. 
 
The idea of an African identity, which puts considerable faith in solidarity with other African 
countries, is accepted in different ways by domestic actors, and support for it may rise or fall 
according to changeable political and economic situations. At this moment, arguments for the 
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promotion of national interests in aid approaches are more common among aid-related workers 
than those for an African identity. Therefore, the relative power balance of actors is favorable 
to actors for South Africa’s domestic rather than external interests, causing the stagnation of 
integration of aid administration in South Africa. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
integration of aid administration is a highly political process, although DAC recommends it be 
undertaken in a less politicized manner. 
 
Keywords: South Africa, aid administration, norms, identities, power balance 
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1. Introduction 
Emerging countries are increasing their influence in international politics and the global 
economy and, consequently, they are also increasing their presence as providers of foreign aid.1 
These countries, however, do not necessarily offer aid in the same form as the ‘ideal aid’ offered 
by traditional donors, particularly for members of the OECD/DAC (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee). DAC has been making 
efforts to bring together—or integrate—aid-related directions, systems and procedures among 
member countries. These are variously referred to as ‘DAC norms’, ‘DAC standards’, ‘DAC 
recommendations’, ‘DAC guidelines’ or ‘DAC aid models’. For instance, both aid donors and 
recipients are expected to make responsible commitments to international aid initiatives such as 
poverty reduction, aid effectiveness and harmonization (OECD/DAC 2008, 22–24). Aid donors 
are also expected to improve their aid system by (1) integrating aid institutions, (2) introducing 
legal frameworks to define aid objectives, strategies and policies by a single ODA (official 
development assistance) act, (3) disclosing aid-related information, (4) monitoring and 
evaluating aid performance, and (5) gaining public support for aid through active dialogue with 
civil society (OECD/DAC 2008, 11–12). In this sense, the degree of integration of aid 
administration—the focus of this article—could also be a benchmark to measure how well 
emerging donors’ approaches are consistent with the ‘DAC aid model’. 
In reality, however, this DAC aid model remains rather conceptual: individual DAC 
members are diverse and their aid approaches are not always fully compatible with the DAC 
approach. Similarly, emerging donors are also diverse and their approaches do not necessarily 
                                            
1 In this paper, regardless of the donor preference of formal terms, ‘aid’ or ‘aid approaches’ roughly 
includes all activities, such as financial assistance, economic co-operation, and South-South 
co-operation, which the emerging donors themselves generally consider to be aid. As Saidi and Wolf 
(2011, 7) argue, the aid-like behaviours of emerging donors do not fit this definition since the 
behaviours of emerging donors blur the boundary between trade, investment and aid in the narrow sense, 
as well as the boundary between public and private. This rough definition is used because emerging 
donors often lack a shared understanding of aid in the same sense as DAC members. 
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harmonize with the DAC aid model. This leads to questions about the origins of the diversity of 
individual aid approaches. Kondoh (2015) argued that the identities and norms of 
donors—which are shaped and constructed in the international community—define the interests 
of each donor, and this ultimately formulates their individual approach to aid. According to this 
logic, it is naturally appropriate to understand that identities and norms determine interests, but 
not vice versa. However, in reality, interests may precede norms. Moreover, conventional 
literature focuses on the performance of individual donors in terms of aid allocation by recipient 
regions, sector and modalities. Hence, the available literature on emerging donors does not pay 
due attention to the institutionalization of aid administrations of emerging donors, including 
South Africa. 
Different sets of norms and interests may have different impacts on the integration of aid 
administration among donors. For example, a bipolar aid administration has been 
institutionalized in South Korea 2  due to the rivalry between the foreign ministry, which 
advocates for universal norms and diplomatic interests, and the economic ministry, which 
pushes for interest-centered economic policies. On the other hand, a single aid administration 
has been established in Taiwan to promote the interests of the foreign ministry. 
Unlike the universalistic and normative assumption by DAC that aid administration 
should be integrated for better aid effectiveness, this working paper examines how and why the 
integration of aid administration has stagnated in South Africa, focusing particularly on the roles 
of norms and interests of aid-related stakeholders in integrating or dis-integrating aid 
administration. To address this goal, in Section 2, this paper conducts a review of the literature 
on diverse aid and its origins. Section 3 summarizes the institutionalization process of aid 
administration in South Africa. South Africa is not only a salient emerging aid donor but is also 
the only major donor on the African Continent in a regional sense and, in a global sense, the only 
                                            
2 South Korea gained membership of DAC in 2010. However, it might also be considered an ‘emerged’ 
donor and, therefore, it remains different to the DAC aid model. 
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African country to be a member of the influential BRICS (Brazil, Russia India, China and South 
Africa) group. In addition, South Africa has recently attempted to integrate its aid 
administration—an attempt that appears to have stagnated. The fourth section, therefore, 
examines the reasons for the unsuccessful integration of aid administration in South Africa. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Diversity of Aid Approaches 
Aid is not a monolithic entity; instead, there is considerable diversity between donors. A number 
of researchers have developed systems for classifying this diversity. Lancaster (2007, 4–5, 13–
17), for example, pays attention to the purposes of aid, arguing that aid purposes are dominant 
for individual donors and their relative balance may determine the patterns of aid, specific to 
each donor. While aid purposes, for example, can be classified into diplomatic, development, 
humanitarian and commercial aspects, in reality, donors frequently combine 
purposes—although the relative weights of each combination may differ (Kondoh et al. 2010, 8; 
Kondoh 2015, 14). 
Hook (1995) and Schraeder, Hook and Taylor (1998), focusing on aid performance, 
considers the purposes of foreign aid from the US, Japan, Sweden and France. The approach 
taken by US aid—which puts salient importance on geopolitical national security 
considerations—aims at reinforcing its hegemonic rule as a superpower. By contrast, the 
prominent feature of Japanese aid is its heavy emphasis on promoting its commercial and 
neo-mercantilist interests. Swedish aid is rooted in its traditions of domestic solidarity and 
social-democracy: its middle power status in the international community constrains its choice 
of aid approach away from the kinds of costly aid programs offered by superpowers or major 
trading nations—the main reason why Sweden has chosen its focus on humanitarian aid. France 
has a particular interest in maintaining close ties with its former colonies, and therefore, French 
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aid is characterized by deepening its economic interdependence with recipients in order to 
expand French culture and promote its economic and cultural interests. Hence, an examination 
of aid purposes suggests that aid approaches are diverse, ranging from ‘realist’ aid for advancing 
donors’ military, political, diplomatic, economic and cultural powers, to ‘idealist’ aid to advocate 
humanitarian purposes. By contrast, there have been only a few attempts to classify the diverse 
aid forms of emerging donors. Kondoh (2015) points out the diversity of emerging donors by 
categorizing them into the emerging superpowers model (China and, potentially, India), the 
regional powers model (South Africa), and the middle powers model (Arab donors and South 
Korea). 
 
2.2 Origins of the Diversity of Aid Approaches 
Conventional literature on aid by DAC/non-DAC members reveals the diversity of aid 
approaches. However, this literature seems to have paid limited attention to the question of how 
diverse aid approaches are formulated. In other words, it is not clear why Nordic countries have 
adopted a humanitarian approach to aid, and why Japanese aid has been neo-mercantilist. What 
is more significant is that the analytical scope of conventional literature has been limited to 
traditional donors; hence it could not explain why the aid approaches of new donors have been 
diverse. 
It has generally been pointed out that external elements, such as geopolitical interests, 
political relationships with donors’ neighboring countries, donors’ diplomatic strategies for 
advancing their status in the international community, and even pressure from other donors, 
could all be major factors that result in diversity of aid approaches (Kondoh 2015). In addition to 
recognizing the importance of these factors, this paper places emphasis on domestic factors 
among donors. This is primarily because domestic factors determine donors’ responses to 
external factors. As Lancaster (2007, 9) argues, aid policies are not only influenced by external 
considerations but are also influenced and constrained by domestic factors. Domestic politics is 
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of particular significance, playing mediating roles between international/external interests and 
domestic/internal interests. This may be relevant since, despite similar international conditions, 
different domestic actors within individual donors may respond differently. Thus, this paper 
notes that both external and domestic factors are closely related to each other. 
The next question, therefore, concerns the major domestic factors that may determine 
aid approaches. Traditionally, the interests of donors or domestic actors in aid approaches are 
considered to be the first domestic factor. McKinlay and Little (1977, 1979) and McKinlay 
(1978), analyzing US aid allocations from the 1960s to the 1970s, examined whether recipient 
needs (RN) or donor interests (DI) could explain the country’s aid allocations. They conclude 
that donor security and political interests are decisive. Furthermore, Maizels and Nissanke 
(1984) argue that, while recipient needs are significant in multilateral aid, donor interests are the 
primary factor in determining bilateral aid in the case of the US, France, Germany, Japan and the 
UK. This is highly relevant since ODA is not purely charity but a government action that is 
implemented through a donor’s public policy. This conclusion suggests that aid is basically 
donors’ activities to advance their own national interests. Therefore, this paper should primarily 
focus on donor’s interests rather than recipient needs. Moreover, this conclusion implies that the 
formulation and integration of aid administration at the national level could be reflected in a 
donor’s national interests—something that is supposed to be the goal of aid activities. 
The second domestic factor, by contrast, is a rather non-material factor that has come 
into focus more recently. Non-material and often invisible elements—such as values, norms, 
identities, ideas and ideologies 3 —are internalized by major actors, and such internalized 
                                            
3 Hereafter, ‘identities and norms.’ Identities are concisely defined here as ‘collective self-image in 
society.’ ‘Norm’ is defined as a set of expectations on appropriate behaviors (Reilly 2012, 73). Norms 
also mean rules to regulate actions that are consonant with certain values supported by a specific society. 
They include laws, ethics, morals and customs. In short, it is a set of ‘ought tos.’ International norms are 
referred to as “ideas of shared expectations on appropriate behaviors of specific actors in the 
international community” or “codes of behaviors which are regarded as the appropriate for most of 
actors in the international community (Inada 2013, 19–20). Norms, at the individual level, may be 
reproduced through learning (socialization and sanctions) to maintain social order. This understanding is 
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identities and norms may determine the diverse attitudes of each actor to the DAC aid model 
(Kondoh 2015). Constructivism recognizes that, once norms and identities are institutionalized 
and internalized, they construct how the world is interpreted. They also constrain the 
inappropriate behaviors of actors and promote the acceptance—or the convergence—of 
appropriate behaviors by actors (Oyane 2013, 10–1). Identities and norms play an increasing 
role in influencing actors’ attitudes to the DAC aid model. As an example, while South Korea 
has been maintaining commercial interests in aid policy, it has also been active in accepting the 
DAC aid model (Kondoh 2013). It seems contradictory that South Korea has chosen to pursue its 
own commercial interests as well as the DAC aid model, which is rather negative regarding 
donor interests in aid approaches. This contradictory choice of aid activities could not be fully 
accounted for in the traditional literature on donor interests. Rather, as Lumsdaine (1993) argues, 
the direction of aid approaches may be determined by non-material elements, including moral 
concerns. Therefore, aid approaches could be chosen as a result of non-material concerns as 
well—beyond material interests. 
Differences in interests and identities/norms are not confined to actors in DAC. For 
non-DAC donors, the set of interests and identities/norms may not only differ from other DAC 
members but could also diverge from those of other non-DAC donors. This paper argues that this 
diversity of interests and identities/norms can also be seen in different actors among individual 
donors—in other words, different interests and identities/norms are preferred by different 
individuals, groups and organizations. Competition and relative power balance among such 
actors may determine the specific interests and identities/norms for the donor as a whole. 
Aid-related actors consist of politicians, foreign ministries, economic ministries, aid agencies, 
interest groups such as businesses, and civil society, as well as taxpayers (Kondoh et al. 2010, 
11). Civil society organizations, including NGOs, play a particularly influential role as ‘norm 
                                                                                                                                
likely to be the case at the international level as well (Kondoh 2015, 2). 
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entrepreneurs’ (Yamamoto 2008, 99). However, in the case of emerging donors, political space 
for civil society is often limited and, instead, conservative political elites often have predominant 
power in determining the interests, norms and ideologies of donors, thus lowering the level of 
convergence. In particular, competition between foreign ministries, which may often share 
international aid norms, and economic ministries, bodies more oriented to economically defined 
national interests, could be one of the determinants of interests and identities/norms of individual 
donors as a whole. 
The coalition among stakeholders also matters in terms of convergence. If the strongest 
possible coalition prefers advocacy-oriented civil society over economic concerns, the relative 
power balance of political actors will favor more humanitarian norms of aid 
approaches—thereby promoting convergence. In contrast, if the economic ministry aligns with 
the business sector, this may result in conservative commercialist aid practices. Thus, when 
influential interests and identities/norms of emerging donors are examined, attention should be 
paid to the relative power balance and coalitions of domestic political actors (Kondoh 2015, 16–
7). It should be emphasized that the intensity of norms and interests is neither a given nor static; 
rather it may be diverse and changeable. Consequently, different donors may prefer specific aid 
approaches that are based on specific norms at one time while, at other times, they may pursue 
specific donor interests. Thus, it is implied that aid approaches do not necessarily develop from 
neo-commercialist to humanitarian forms of aid in a unilinear or irreversible manner. 
 
2.3 Analytical Framework 
Based on the above brief literature review on the causes of the diversity of aid approaches, this 
paper pays particular attention to (1) the roles of both interests and norms of stakeholders (such 
as presidents, political parties, aid-related ministries and agencies, civil society and taxpayers), 
and (2), the relative power balance of the stakeholders. Different stakeholders prefer different 
sets of norms and interests. Public policy—including the organizational design of the aid 
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administration—would be the political output that is made through interactions among different 
actors and the relative power balance of diverse actors. In South Africa, some stakeholders are 
likely to have particular norms or interests which are opposed to the integration of aid 
administration. 
 
3. South Africa’s Aid 
3.1 Formation and Transformation of South Africa’s Aid 
South Africa has a longstanding and complicated experience of being an aid donor. It has 
recently been attempting to streamline its aid administration by establishing a new aid agency, 
the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), although analysis later in this 
section indicates that it is not operational yet. Initially, South Africa’s political isolation provided 
the motivation for assisting neighboring countries under its apartheid regime. Until 1994, when 
the apartheid was abolished, South Africa was under sanctions from the international community. 
The State Security Council of South Africa, independent of the foreign ministry, pursued a 
military approach to the pro-African National Congress (ANC) and neighboring majority-ruled 
countries. This Council also assisted Lesotho, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Comoro and 
Paraguay in cultivating diplomatic support for South Africa (Alden and le Pere 2003, 11–2; 
Sidiropoulos 2012, 220).4 
The collapse of the apartheid regime drastically changed this aid policy. The Apartheid 
Economic Co-operation Promotion Loan Fund was replaced by the newly established African 
Renaissance Fund (ARF) in 2000. Under the Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation (DIRCO), the ARF became a systematically institutionalized aid agency that was 
                                            
4 Aid to deal with diplomatic isolation/competition can also be seen in Korean aid until the 1970s and 
Taiwan’s aid up until the present. Through the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), South 
Africa also provided ‘international’ aid to pseudo self-governing black territories (described as 
‘homelands’ or ‘Bantustans’), which only South Africa recognized as legitimate and independent states 
(Besharati 2013, 17). 
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used as an instrument to promote the diplomatic goals of South Africa. The establishment of 
ARF was based on Thabo Mbeki’s concept of an African Renaissance Spirit, which strongly 
supported partnership and solidarity among African nations. The ARF had a mandate to offer 
funds comprehensively and provide assistance in advancing democracy, good governance, 
conflict resolution, socio-economic development, humanitarian disaster relief, technical 
co-operation and capacity development (Besharati 2013, 19). However, the ARF was strongly 
criticized by opposition parties in 2010 on the grounds that the ARF was too bureaucratic, 
causing organizational problems such as operational delays, lack of co-ordination and poor 
strategy. They also argued that it was not properly monitored and, consequently, it propped up 
rogue states that violated human rights (Guinea and Zimbabwe). It even assisted with 
non-developmental projects such as the African Cup of Nations in Mali in 2002 (Sidiropoulos 
2012, 227–30; Lucey and O’Riordan 2014, 3). 
Preceding such criticism, in 2007, the ruling ANC discussed the introduction of a new 
agency, which would cover poverty reduction in all countries on the African continent. It was 
decided to establish a new agency to streamline and co-ordinate aid activities in a coherent 
manner and to double its aid volume from 0.2–0.5 as a percentage of ODA/GNI (official 
development assistance/gross national income) (Besharati 2013, 34). DIRCO drafted the 
SADPA bill, which was approved in December 2012. Accordingly, it was intended that SADPA 
would be established in June 2013 as the new agency for development co-operation from South 
Africa. It was envisioned that SADPA should help to ‘to develop partnerships that drive 
innovation around development cooperation in Africa and developing countries to create 
self-sufficient societies’ (Casoo 2012). One of the key strategies of SADPA would be to ensure 
co-crafting of the policy focus. This meant that SADPA should operate in a demand-driven 
manner. SADPA would also prioritize other African countries as recipients. 
It should be noted that, as proposed, SADPA, can be seen as typically a South-South 
co-operation model, which emphasizes common interests and mutual benefits among recipients 
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and South Africa (Casoo 2012; Interview with South African aid worker: August 14, 2013).5 
South Africa is thus endeavoring to advocate non-interference for recipient countries, emphasize 
its coalition and partnership with other African countries and respect the ownership of the 
recipients. However, while South Africa’s aid does emphasize its partnership with African 
countries, South Africa has already secured its own economic interests through the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) and DBSA. At the same time, it also advocates the Paris 
Declaration and Good Governance Agenda, seemingly approaching the DAC aid model. While 
some similarities can be seen between South Africa’s aid approach and the DAC model in their 
prioritization of democratization and good governance of the recipients, South Africa is less 
positive about imposing these priorities on the recipients as political conditionalities.6 
In sum, South Africa has a unique emphasis towards aid in its focus on Africa for Africa. 
Kobayashi (2013, 249) suggests that South Africa may have a hybrid aid model, which combines 
South-South co-operation and DAC-like ODA. Among the other aid-related organizations of 
South Africa, perhaps SADPA would be closer to the DAC aid model while it also maintains an 
identity as South-South co-operation model. Its hybrid aid is distinct since it skillfully integrates 
horizontal South-South co-operation and vertical DAC-recipient co-operation.7 By mixing both, 
                                            
5 According to the UNOSSC (United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation), established in 1974 
to promote South-South co-operation, ‘South-South cooperation can be defined as an exchange of 
knowledge and resources in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental or technical domain 
between developing countries. It can take place on a bilateral, regional, subregional or interregional 
basis and can involve two or more developing countries.’ UNCTAD (2006), a mainstream organisation 
to promote horizontal South-South co-operation rather than vertical DAC-recipient aid transfer, defines 
South-South co-operation as “economic and technical co-operation among developing countries in trade, 
investment and finance.” South-South co-operation is referred to as the wide-ranging exchanges of 
resources, technologies, skills and technical know-how among the Southern Nations to promote 
development (Besharati 2013, 36). This emphasis, particularly towards the productive sectors, is 
different from the recent development discourses where the focus is on social sectors (Walz and 
Ramachandran 2011, 17). Rowlands (2008, 17) identified South Africa and Brazil as regionally 
specialised small-scale donors. 
6 In the DIRCO interview in 2013, the interviewee mentioned that issues of human rights and 
democratisation in recipient countries are scopes of aid, not conditions of aid. However, as an exception 
to this rule, South Africa pre-conditioned good governance reform in exchange for approving a loan 
requested by the Government of Swaziland in 2011. 
7 By contrast, both China and India have not formulated hybrid aid approaches since they do not 
incorporate the DAC aid model while advocating South-South co-operation. Rather, Japanese aid 
approach has been hybrid since it combines its own aid and the DAC aid model. 
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South Africa is attempting to create a Southern hybrid aid model. In addition, SADPA exists only 
as a legal entity and has not yet materialized; therefore, aid administration is far from integrated. 
It could provisionally be concluded that its attempt has not been successful so far. 
 
3.2 The Performance of South Africa’s Aid 
Although South Africa faces serious domestic challenges of domestic poverty and inequality, as 
a regional power, it has been engaging in South-South co-operation with African countries in 
particular. However, South Africa’s aid has been implemented under a highly decentralized 
administrative structure: individual ministries and agencies, provinces, and municipalities have 
been engaging in international co-operation. Despite the difficulties in estimating the total 
volume of South Africa’s aid, the aid burden of South Africa seems heavy. The ODA/GNI ratio 
is estimated to be as high as 0.7–1.0 percent (Besharati 2013, 32). However, it is arguable 
whether or not all aid by South Africa fits within the DAC-defined concept of ODA (32). This is 
because assistance by South Africa includes wider efforts, such as peace-building, debt 
cancellation, non-concessional loans to infrastructure development, de facto ‘budget support’ 
through the revenue from customs duty tariffs, and some training, scholarships and technical 
co-operation (36). If transfers through SACU and Common Monetary Area (CMA) as well as 
assistance by the defence ministry are excluded, and if DAC standards are applied, other 
estimates have indicated that the aid volume of South Africa in the 2000s was US$280 million,8 
equivalent to 0.17 percent of ODA/GNI (Rowlands 2008, 12). 
The various schemes and sectors of South Africa’s aid are diverse, reflecting a 
decentralized aid administration. The ARF covers untied grant assistance from peace-building9 
                                            
8 Before the plan to establish SADPA reached an impasse, the volume of SADPA’s annual budget was 
predicted to be approximately 500 million rand (US$50 million dollars) (Lucey and O’Riordan 2014, 1). 
9 South Africa has been engaging in a number of peace-building projects. In particular, governance 
projects have been implemented to assist legislative bill drafting, diplomat trainings, and 
capacity-building of public services in DRC, Burundi and South Sudan. This governance assistance has 
been identified as components of peace-building assistance (Lucey and O’Riordan 2014, 5). 
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to general technical co-operation.10 For example, the ARF offers technical co-operation in the 
areas of public services and administration as well as institutional and capacity-building for 
democratization and good governance to Burundi, South Sudan, Comoro, Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) (Nganje 2013, 2). By contrast, DBSA, a huge financial institution with an 
annual disbursement of 17 billion rand in 2016, provides long-term loans for infrastructural 
development on the African continent, though they are less concessional (Interview with South 
African aid worker, June 21, 2017). 
 
3.3 Aid Administration in South Africa 
South Africa’s aid approach has hitherto been implemented in a decentralized framework, 
lacking a centralized co-ordination mechanism, and resulting in the fragmentation of aid projects. 
Against this background, it was intended that SADPA would co-ordinate among aid-related 
administrations and implement a wide range of aid schemes. Government ministries are very 
aware of the necessity of centralized co-ordination.11 According to the explanation by DIRCO, 
the macro functions of SADPA are to: 
 
1. Develop policy guidelines on outgoing South African development cooperation and ensure 
coherence throughout government in implementation; 
2. Support programmes and projects for outgoing development cooperation partnerships and 
use the Fund to support programmes and projects; 
3. Provide technical advice on foreign policy in the area of development cooperation; 
                                            
10 The volume of assistance by ARF in 2016 was approximately 100 million rand. The ARF is the aid 
agency in charge of grant aid; however, exceptionally it also has also extended a loan project to Cuba, 
which was undertaken for diplomatic considerations. 
11 According to one interviewee, the election in DRC in 2012 was assisted by ten South African 
organisations, with South Africa’s government ministries agreeing to greater co-ordination in aid 
(Interview with South African aid worker: June 23, 2017). 
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4. Build and maintain close cooperation and liaison with international development 
cooperation agencies and other stakeholders on behalf of the Minister of International 
Relations and Cooperation; 
5. Maintain oversight for all South Africa’s officials on outgoing development cooperation 
and assistance (for bilateral, trilateral and multilateral partnerships with countries, 
development institutions, civil society and the private sector); 
6. Conduct an annual accountability audit, and monitoring and evaluation for all outgoing 
development co-operation; and 
7. Ensure effective management and administration of the Partnership Fund for Development 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016). 
 
The fifth function, in particular, clearly states that SADPA has the authorization to 
monitor overall aid functions of the South African government. 
South Africa was scheduled to centralize its fragmented aid administration under 
SADPA on the initiative of DIRCO in 2013. At the time of writing, in 2017, SADPA had been 
legally established but, due to delays in the legislative process, it has not yet been 
operationalized as an aid implementing agency and aid co-ordination mechanism. Instead, a 
provisional step seems to have been taken: the ARF was upgraded to a legislation body by 
legislative proceedings in 2015, and it was restructured with more staff members and a wider 
scope of operations. Although financial allocations from the National Treasury (NT) to ARF 
have been curbed following the austere fiscal policy from 2016 (Parliamentary Monitoring 
Group 2016), the newly reinforced ARF generally incorporated all of the functions of SADPA 
except for the co-ordination functions of South Africa’s aid (Interview with South African aid 
worker: June 23, 2017). 
If and when SADPA is successfully established, its financial constraints, as well as the 
division of labor among other ministries, agencies and provinces, are expected to confine its 
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scope to grant aid and technical co-operation, as with ARF (Besharati 2013, 54). 12 What 
differentiates SADPA from the ARF is their co-ordination functions rather than their aid scope 
and scale. ARF under DIRCO was supposed to co-ordinate the ARF’s own projects while 
SADPA was expected to co-ordinate the aid operations of South Africa as a whole. However, as 
noted above, the process of SADPA’s establishment has become stagnant. 
Hence, the tradition of decentralized aid administration remains: in addition to major aid 
agencies such as the ARF under DIRCO, as well as DBSA under NT, at least four ministries of 
DIRCO, NT, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Presidency have been playing 
significant roles in their aid approach; other ministries of justice, defence (offering PKO-related 
projects), 13  police, education (offering scholarship programmes), energy, agriculture, and 
science and technology are visible actors. Most provinces also have their own aid-related 
operations (Besharati 2013, 31, 45, 7).14 Overall, South Africa’s aid seems rather complex, and 
different organizations have different interests and norms, which are not coordinated. 
 
4. Factors that Lead to Less Integration of Aid Administration 
As seen in the previous section, South Africa initially commenced aid under a decentralized 
administrative structure, but more recently it embarked on a process of integrating aid 
administration. Nevertheless, its integration of aid administration has so far been less than 
successful. This section analyses the factors that may influence administrative integration by 
                                            
12 For instance, DBSA would be able to maintain large-scale loan schemes even after SADPA’s 
establishment. 
13 Since South Africa recognises that regional stability is significant to South Africa itself and that peace 
and security are preconditions for development, more than half of South African aid is allocated to the 
defence and security sector (Rowlands 2008, 8). 
14 This decentralised aid mechanism can also be seen in overall aid provision. For instance, it was 
estimated that the aid volume of the ARF covered just 3–4 percent of the total aid volume of South 
Africa (Besharati 2013, 19). 
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focusing on three questions raised in Section 2. In particular, this section focuses on identities 
and norms as well as interests in aid. 
 
4.1 Aid-Relating Identities and Norms 
As an African middle power, South Africa has more complicated norms to balance against 
DAC-led norms and South-South co-operation. Under the apartheid regime, South Africa 
maintained its identity as a developed country, which functioned as the outpost of white 
civilization in ‘the Dark Continent’ (Sidiropoulos 2012, 221). Since the collapse of apartheid, 
South Africa has had multiple complicated identities as an upper middle-income country 
(UMIC), a member of BRICS and G-20, an aid recipient and donor, an African country, a leader 
of South-South co-operation, and an outstanding center of triangular co-operation (Besharati 
2013, 58). 
Within these complex identities, the ANC regime, in particular, has emphasized its 
African and its ‘nation of the South’ identities (Sidiropoulos 2012, 221). At the time of SADPA’s 
establishment, there was a vision that South Africa could be an actor that contributes to 
sustainable development, democracy, rule of law, peace and security on the African continent 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016). This perception became attached to the concept of an 
‘African identity’. Even now, such a perception is shared by some influential actors, as 
obviously seen in the comments by a Member of Parliament for the ANC, Ms. M. Dikgale, that 
South Africa’s assistance should not place disproportionate emphasis on the economic sector but 
instead pay greater attention to humanitarian assistance to other African countries 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016). 
Nevertheless, different actors internalized some aspects of the complex identities and 
norms of South Africa. In addition, actors’ preferences regarding these identities and norms are 
changeable according to shifting circumstances in the domestic political economy. Certainly, 
DIRCO still argues that South Africa—as a UMIC, BRICS and G20 member—is required to 
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make its due international contributions, based on the international norm of allocating one 
percent of GDP to international co-operation. DIRCO also argues that South Africa should assist 
neighboring countries for as long as it clearly emphasizes its African identity (Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group 2016). However, enthusiasm for the concept of an African identity, which 
was reiterated when SADPA was established, recently seems to have waned in the government 
and society in South Africa. This is probably due to the recent deterioration of the South African 
economy, bureaucratic infighting, and growing support for the opposition Democratic Alliance 
(DA)—factors that have embedded attitudes toward South Africa’s aid approach much more in 
its domestic logic. This makes South Africa’s aid more representative of domestic and material 
interests, rather than an equal coalition with other African countries, motivated by its African 
identity. 
 
4.2 Aid-Related Actors’ Interests 
The complex identities and norms identified in the previous section in South Africa are not 
shared by all actors with equal intensity nor are always influential with the same intensity. In 
reality, some actors may at some time prefer their own interests and national interests. 
Support for the African identity, which was a norm basis for the establishment of 
SADPA, seems to be weakening. This illustrates that both identities and norms can be 
changeable according to fluctuating situations in the political economy and that specific political 
and economic interests, in some situations, may be more influential in regard to aid than certain 
identities and norms. In fact, the current aid approach of South Africa is embedded in various 
political, social and economic interests as a means of reconciling internal development needs 
with external aid policy (Besharati 2013, 58). 
In regard to political interests—particularly diplomatic interests—South Africa has been 
actively engaged in multilateral organizations for its political strategies. For example, South 
Africa has been reinforcing the African Union (AU) as its main channel for multilateral security, 
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development and political decision-making in Africa. In fact, since the foundation of the AU, the 
Government of South Africa has remained in the top five largest contributors to the budget of the 
AU15 as well as one of the few countries that pay their subscription punctually. South Africa also 
hosted the AU’s Pan African Parliament in Midrand, South Africa, and the former Foreign 
Minister of South Africa, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, became a candidate for the Chairperson of 
the AU in 2012. Similarly, South Africa has been vigorously committed to the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). Among the 15 member countries, South Africa is the 
biggest contributor, contributing 20 percent of the operations budget of the SADC. It chaired the 
political, defence and security organs of the SADC between 2009 and 2010, as well as playing an 
active role in the SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (Besharati 2013, 22; 
Kondoh 2015, 25). The linkage with the national interests can be seen in the case of the 
establishment of SADPA. According to South Africa’s Parliamentary Monitoring Group 
(February 17, 2016), the Parliamentary Committee discussed the progress of SADPA’s 
establishment. A Chief Operations Officer of DIRCO, Ambassador Ebrahim Saley, explained 
the following to committee members: 
 
The approach South Africa takes on development cooperation is that it is seen as a tool 
used to advance South African foreign policy goals. These foreign policy goals are 
guided by domestic priorities or national interests. … South Africa, inspired by its 
national interest, has a vision to be a globally competitive economy and an influential 
and leading member of the international community. South Africa should be a key 
promoter and contributor to sustainable development, democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights, peace and security, within a safe, peaceful and prosperous Southern Africa and 
Africa (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016). 
                                            
15 South Africa contributes 150–200 million rand annually. This contribution is equivalent to about 15 
percent of the annual budget of the AU (Besharati 2013: 22). 
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On the other hand, South Africa has been viewed with caution by neighboring countries. 
Although South Africa identifies itself as ‘a largely benevolent and productive partner or 
neighbor’ (Lucey and O’Riordan 2014, 2), it had to face not only the adverse legacy of its former 
apartheid system but also the negative perceptions of South Africa as ‘a hegemon, big brother, 
and regional bully’ (Besharati 2013, 23). The common critique is that South Africa is proactively 
engaged in aid only for its own selfish economic interests (Sidiropoulos 2012, 218). These 
adverse discourses have even been heard among the high-ranking government officials of 
recipients. For instance, a government official of Botswana explained that Botswana has not 
traditionally received aid from South Africa—except for revenue from SACU and loans from 
DBSA—due to its opposition to the apartheid regime and, more recently, for its high economic 
dependency on South Africa (Interview with Botswanan government official: August 6, 2013). 
With this wariness and similar sensitivities prevalent across African countries, overt realpolitik 
options for South Africa’s self-interest are not usually possible in terms of aid from South Africa. 
This is part of the reason why South Africa has diluted its interests as an aid donor by clearly 
advocating DAC norms that donors should only benefit the recipient’s development. Cautious 
bilateral approaches by South Africa to African countries are also related to its active approach 
to multilateral channels such as the AU and SADC (Besharati 2013, 23). In short, to ease the 
skepticism of recipients, it has been necessary for South Africa’s approach to aid to incorporate 
DAC-like norms, which emphasize the equal partnership between donors and recipients 
(Kondoh 2015, 44–5). 
There certainly are social interests in South Africa’s aid approach: tackling the various 
challenges caused by economic inequalities with neighboring countries. Since there are huge 
economic inequalities between South Africa and its neighbors, massive numbers of economic 
immigrants and criminal groups from these neighboring countries (as well as other countries like 
DRC, Nigeria, Ghana and Somalia) have emigrated to post-apartheid South Africa. This has 
negatively affected the sentiments of South African people, as they believed that immigrants 
 21 
 
from neighboring countries have cost South Africans’ jobs, leading to xenophobic attacks in 
2016 (Interview with South African aid worker: June 20, 2017). For South Africa, if its 
post-conflict assistance to fragile African countries contributes to their stability and 
development, it would also be of benefit for South Africa. This attitude was also confirmed in a 
statement from DIRCO’s Chief Operations Officer, Ambassador Ebrahim Saley, who asserted 
that “it is important for South Africa to contribute to the development of countries so that there is 
no migration. … should the situation in Lesotho for instance be favourable for agriculture 
production, people will not migrate” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016). 
With regard to economic interests, although the aid of South Africa—particularly 
potential assistance by SADPA—claims to pay little formal attention to its commercial interests 
(Interview with South African aid worker: August 14, 2013), it seems misleading to say that 
South Africa does not attach any economic interests to its aid approach. Rather, economic 
interests in aid are increasing. Since regionally embedded South Africa can further secure its 
economic interests through further regional integration, aid is also used as an instrument to 
promote regional integration for its economic interests (Kondoh 2015, 25–6). South Africa has a 
number of channels with which to advance its economic interests in the African continent. In 
2010 the Economic Development Department indicated that assistance to regional growth is not 
only an act of solidarity but also an instrument to ensure economic opportunities for South 
Africa (Besharati 2013, 24). DTI also co-ordinates international co-operation programs through 
SACU. SACU, comprised of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, 
imposes customs and tariffs on trade with countries outside of the region. Customs and tariffs are 
pooled and distributed to member countries. For member countries, apart from South Africa, the 
revenue from SACU is very crucial: it is equivalent to 20–70 percent of national revenues. The 
revenue from SACU is similar to general budget support—or a form of de facto aid—from South 
Africa to neighboring countries (Sidiropoulos 2012, 224–5). In addition, unlike other developing 
countries, with their massive inflows of Chinese products, the markets of Botswana, Lesotho, 
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Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) are dominated by products from South Africa, largely due to 
protection by SACU. 16  Furthermore, South Africa has established regional development 
financial institutions, such as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and DBSA. While 
IDC offers finance to promote industrialization in Southern Africa, DBSA is a state-owned 
financial institution that offers a sizeable amount of finance for infrastructure development in 
SADC member countries.17 South Africa was one of the co-founders of the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, becoming its biggest contributor, and hosting the 
NEPAD Secretariat in South Africa (Besharati 2013, 20–1; Kondoh 2015, 26–7). 
While some actors are keen to aggressively pursue South Africa’s diplomatic and 
economic interests through aid, others are more skeptical about the benefits of offering aid. Mr. 
W. Faber, a Member of Parliament of the opposition DA party, argued that the establishment of 
SADPA would worsen the organizational overlap problem since most of SADPA’s roles had 
been already taken by DIRCO and DTI (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2016). South African 
taxpayers, moreover, have recently become more critical of government expenditures—for 
instance, there was criticism of the ARF peace-building mission, which resulted in the deaths of 
14 South African soldiers in the Central African Republic. This mission became a target for 
public scrutiny, which included the issue of the cost-effectiveness (Lucey and O’Riordan 2014, 
4). 
 
4.3 Relative Balance of Power of Aid-Related Actors 
As shown above, different aid-related actors prefer different norms and interests, and they often 
build policy coalitions to increase their influence on policy. However, different policy coalitions 
                                            
16 SACU has already ensured the markets of BLNS for South Africa; therefore, SADPA should be able 
to concentrate on aid for solidarity rather than for commercialism. 
17 The total amount of loans of DBSA is more than 10 billion rand (Besharati 2013, 44). One-third of 
projects of DBSA are distributed in sectors such as infrastructure, energy, telecommunications, mining, 
transportation, water, manufacturing and health (Sidiropoulos 2012, 231–2). 
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may have different policy instruments: some may have very powerful policy instruments while 
others may not. Different combinations of policy coalitions and their policy instruments 
determine the power of their coalitions. It should be noted that the power of their coalitions is not 
equal; thus, the relative power balance of actors/coalitions enables some powerful actors’ 
interests and norms to be represented in aid policy. The integration of aid administration is also 
determined by the relative balance of power of actors. If all actors’ norms and interests were 
highly converged, and if there were no other actors to countervail against such mainstream 
norms or interests, the aid administration could be integrated into one. By contrast, if aid-related 
actors pursue their own diverse and conflicting norms and interests, and if none of them have 
decisive power to overwhelm the others, it will become difficult to integrate the aid 
administration into one. 
South Africa’s case, illustrating both promotion and recent stagnation of the 
establishment of SADPA, can be largely explained by political factors. It is certainly true that, in 
2013, policymakers of South Africa—particularly ANC members—emphasized African identity 
and ‘universal values’ at a time when the establishment of SADPA was being promoted. South 
Africa seemed to be confident about its rising international political and economic power as one 
of the emerging BRICS. Because the anti-apartheid struggle by the ANC was for basic human 
rights, the ANC’s clear position of supporting pro-‘universal values’ such as human rights, civil 
liberties and democratization naturally reflected the diplomatic policies of the new South Africa 
(Alden and le Pere 2003, 12). The new government began replacing career diplomats with black 
South Africans and by 2000 half of them were black. The Mandela regime welcomed the active 
engagement of civil society in the consultative process (Alden and le Pere 2003, 13–4, 33). 
In 2007, leftists gained power within the ANC, and this resulted in a rather more 
populist redistributive policy to domestic social sectors (Besharati 2013, 12). As was the case 
with Nordic countries (Noël and Thérien 1995), active commitments in domestic welfare policy 
may be linked to their activeness in international aid policy. In 2007, the ANC also suggested the 
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concept of ‘ubuntu’ (humanity); that is—South Africa should share with other African brothers 
in the spirit of solidarity and co-operation. The concept of ubuntu is reflected in the diplomatic 
approaches of South Africa. The White Paper by DIRCO argues for a ‘diplomacy of ubuntu’ that 
includes the values and notions of interconnectedness, partnership, and collaboration within the 
African and global family (Besharati 2013, 25). Accordingly, South Africa stresses its 
differences with traditional donors, its commitment to its identity as a nation of the South and its 
alignment to developing countries. South Africa not only prefers terms such as ‘partner’ rather 
than ‘donor,’ and ‘development co-operation’ rather than ‘aid’ but also avoids conditionality, 
which might be indicative of the sensitivity to South Africa’s prevailing image of economic 
dominance, as ‘a big brother’ in Africa (Sidiropoulos 2012, 232). The change in dominant norms 
and major players thus resulted in changes to its aid approach. In the case of aid policy, 
particularly for SADPA, norms and identities derived from its domestic poverty and African 
solidarity seems to matter (Kondoh 2015, 39–40). 
However, the government of South Africa has never been monolithically integrated. In 
reality, it has cleavages of various norms and interests among actors, which are expressed 
differently according to changing situations of its domestic and international political economy. 
For example, at one time President Jacob Zuma was facing a number of challenges that 
influenced aid policy: allegations of his own corruption, economic recession, and the subsequent 
austere fiscal policies. All of these factors show how he was defined by the logic of domestic 
politics, resulting from recent increases in South Africa’s own interests in finance, commerce, 
politics and defence through its diplomatic policy.18 The increasing predominance of domestic 
logic in aid policy seems to be coincident to the waning enthusiasm for SADPA’s 
establishment.19 Both DIRCO and SADPA seem relatively powerless to address this drastically 
                                            
18 Nonetheless, South African still maintains a number of channels to realise business interests apart 
from foreign aid (Interview with South African aid worker: August 14, 2013). Therefore, it would not be 
realistic to estimate that South Africa’s aid is dominated solely by its economic interests. 
19 In addition, as a purely administrative problem, South Africa’s aid administration has a weakness in 
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changing situation. This may be because they have no strong policy instruments, resulting in a 
relatively less powerful ministry and agency in the Government of South Africa. 
In fact, firstly, DIRCO had its power circumscribed by the budget-making authority, NT, 
which was in conflict with a rival ministry, DTI, and was marginalized by the defence ministry 
(Alden and le Pere 2003, 16–7).20 Other examples of typical intra-bureaucratic infighting can 
also be seen: some ministries have reservations about the central co-ordination and control of aid 
policy by DIRCO. According to an aid-related person, SADPA was initially supposed to 
consolidate all statistical data and reporting on aid; however, its mandate was gradually 
expanded to the point that SADPA was becoming a super-agency of aid. Other ministries and 
agencies become concerned that DIRCO may intervene in their aid projects, although such 
projects are not funded under DIRCO’s budget. NT is said to have argued that it NT should 
control aid as long as the aid budget is allocated through NT’s budget processes (Interview with 
South African aid worker: June 21, 2017).21 DIRCO, despite its aggressive quest for central 
control over all aid, lacks budget-making power, which only the powerful NT has. 
Secondly, even inside of the foreign ministry, there have been divisions between 
‘idealistic internationalists’, who “returned from long years in exile with an orientation towards 
‘a demonstrably greater degree of solidarity with the collective problems of the developing 
                                                                                                                                
project delivery and continuity due to its high personnel turnover rate, and in less transparent 
procurement and low project management skills. As was pointed out, this is the case with SADPA, 
which lacked the resources to contextualise aid projects to recipient needs (Lucey and O'Riordan 2014, 
6–7). 
20 It might be controversial to say that the interests of South Africa’s military industry are not 
negligible; South Africa was the 10th largest arms manufacturing country in 1994, with 800 military 
companies employing a labour force of 50,000 people, earning 1.03 billion rand by exporting weapons 
to 61 countries. The armament industry was also the second largest exporter in the manufacturing sector 
in South Africa (Alden and le Pere 2003, 24). Moreover, the South African military has been involved in 
the provision of assistance to the security sector in the region and has participated in election 
observation missions in Zimbabwe (Interview with South African aid worker: August 6, 2013). 
21 To take an example of another concrete problem, South Africa’s Department of Defence has been not 
only providing huge financial resources to PKO activities but also increasing its operations. The defence 
department thinks that intra-departmental decision-making enables swift and flexible responses. 
Nonetheless, some aid-related people wonder if DIRCO centrally controls South Africa’s aid, and the 
bureaucratic process of adjustment may damage the flexibility of aid (Interview with South African aid 
worker: June 21, 2017). 
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world’,” and ‘realistic neo-mercantilists’, who belonged to the apartheid-era ruling government 
which focused on “the importance of trade and self-interests over all else” (Alden and le Pere 
2003, 14, 26; Kondoh 2015, 41). 
Thirdly, outside of DIRCO or the public sector in general, few actors have supported 
DIRCO’s initiative to establish SADPA. The volume of South Africa’s aid remains 500 million 
rand out of a 3,000 billion rand national budget; thus few government bureaucrats, Members of 
Parliament, businesses, civil society groups, journalists or taxpayers have paid attention to this 
‘minor issue’. South Africa’s aid is discussed only in a small circle (Interview with South 
African aid worker: June 20, 2017). The opposition DA party, supported by the wealthier white 
and black class, prefers a small government and is cautious about expanding external aid. While 
businesses may seem remote from DIRCO and SADPA, there are several South African 
construction companies and consultancies that have been already engaged in various aid projects 
(Interview with South African aid worker: June 21, 2017). Businesses can ensure their economic 
interests in aid policy without SADPA. Civil society organizations (CSOs), after participating in 
public policy-making during the Mandela regime, were marginalized during the Mbeki 
administration (Alden and le Pere 2003, 17, 33).22 In sum, there are few actors, outside DIRCO, 
who have high expectations for the establishment of SADPA. 
This section examined the question of why South Africa’s efforts to integrate its aid 
administration have been less than successful. It was found that the actors who advocate 
centralized policy co-ordination and aid for African identities and ‘universal’ norms—both of 
which are supposed to be materialized by SADPA—are relatively powerless. By contrast, those 
who support political, social and economic interests of South Africa have powerful instruments 
to influence aid policy process and realize their interests under the decentralized aid system. This 
difference in the relative power balance of actors, which is favorable to actors among South 
                                            
22 President Mbeki is said to have disempowered the roles of Parliament and the ruling ANC in public 
policy-making (Alden and le Pere 2003, 32–3). 
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Africa’s domestic interests, has resulted in the stagnation of integration of the aid administration 
in South Africa. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examined the question of how and why the integration of the aid administration has 
been stymied in South Africa. As seen in the second section, conventional literature—which 
examines the factors that can potentially determine approaches to aid—initially focused on 
donors’ interests rather than recipient needs. This type of analysis is now being replaced by a 
new emphasis on the roles of non-material elements: identities and norms. Once they are 
internalized to aid-related actors, identities and norms can determine aid approaches. 
Nonetheless, this paper has argued that the intensity of both interests and identities/norms may 
be different among donors, within donors and at different time periods. To understand why 
different interests and identities/norms are chosen, this paper examined the interests and norms 
of stakeholders, and how the relative power balance among stakeholders determines the 
integration of aid administration. 
The third and fourth sections analyzed the reasons that the integration of aid 
administration has stagnated in South Africa. South Africa is the only influential emerging donor 
on the African continent and has—to some extent—adopted an African identity, and this is 
shared by those currently in power. This was crucial in attempts to establish a central aid 
co-ordination mechanism, SADPA. However, a range of political, social, and economic factors, 
along with the indifference of media and taxpayers, have prevented SADPA from proceeding. 
The emergence of an African identity, through which a great amount of faith was offered in 
solidarity with other African countries, is accepted differently by various domestic actors. 
However, at least at this moment, national interests in aid approaches are more clearly 
recognized among the aid community than arguments for a shared African identity. Therefore, 
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the relative power balance of actors is favorable to those working for South Africa’s domestic 
interests, thus resulting in the stagnation of the process of integrating the aid administration in 
South Africa. 
This paper has revealed that South Africa’s aid approach is formed and transformed by 
complex processes and structures, particularly due to the relative power balance of major actors. 
That is, unlike the debate around either interests or norms, it is not either-or but both interests 
and norms together that led to the stagnation of the process of integrating aid administration. It 
should also be noted that interests and norms themselves do not determine aid approaches. 
Rather, through the relative power balance of actors, particular interests and norms are reflected 
in an aid approach. As for the question of why aid approaches are so diverse and changeable, the 
findings in this paper suggest that more attention should be paid to the actual political processes 
in which the diverse interests and norms of individual donors are coordinated. The integration of 
aid administration is a highly political process that may differ among donors, regardless of 
whether they are from traditional or emerging spheres. Nonetheless, the DAC recommends that 
further integration take place in a less politicized manner. The stagnation of the integration of 
South Africa’s aid administration uniquely illustrates that politics matters: those who were 
positive about integration were politically weak while those who were negative were politically 
influential. 
This paper is comprised of a single country case study, and further comparative research 
is anticipated that will analyze how the different power balances between actors within donors 
institutionalize different political processes, and how this results in different aid processes. 
 
 
Acronyms 
ANC  African National Congress 
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ARF  African Renaissance Fund 
BLNS  Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland 
BRICS  Brazil, Russia India, China and South Africa 
CMA  Common Monetary Area 
DA  Democratic Alliance 
DAC  Development Assistance Committee 
DBSA  Development Bank of Southern Africa 
DI  donor interests 
DIRCO  Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo 
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry 
GNI  gross national income 
IDC  Industrial Development Corporation 
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
NT  National Treasury 
ODA  official development assistance 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
RN  recipient needs 
SACU  Southern African Customs Union 
SADC  Southern African Development Community 
SADPA  South African Development Partnership Agency 
UMIC  upper middle-income country 
UNOSSC United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation 
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Abstract (in Japanese) 
要約 
 
本ワーキングペーパーは、南アフリカの援助行政の統合が、どのように、なぜ実現し
ていないのかを分析する。 
 援助決定要因を分析した先行研究は当初、援助受入国の開発ニーズよりも援助供与
国の利益に焦点を当てていた。近年、こうした分析はアイデンティティ・規範といっ
た非物質的要素の役割を重視する理解が主流を占めるようになっている。つまり、援
助関連のステークホルダーが特定アイデンティティ・規範を一度内面化すれば、それ
らアイデンティティ・規範が援助戦略や政策のあり方を決定するようになると考える
のである。しかし、本ペーパーは、選好される物質的利益もアイデンティティ・規範
もともに重要であり、それらの内容・強度は援助供与国によっても、同一援助供与国
内であったとしても時期によっても異なることを論じる。従って、本ペーパーでは、
援助行政の統合において、ステークホルダーが選好する利益・規範双方の役割に焦点
を当てることにする。 
 南アフリカは、卓越した新興援助供与国であるだけでなく、地域的に見てもアフリ
カ大陸で唯一の主要ドナーであるし、グローバルな視点で見ても影響力ある BRICS の
一角を占めている。近年、南アフリカは前大統領、与党、国際関係・協力省が「アフ
リカン・アイデンティティ」を強調し、同時に、分権的であった同国の援助行政を集
権化・統合する試みを重ねてきた。その結果、集権化された援助調整メカニズムとし
て、南アフリカ開発パートナーシップ庁（SADPA：South African Development 
Partnership Agency）の設立が準備されてきた。しかし、大統領の交替、現職大統領
の汚職疑惑とリーダーシップの後退、野党による批判、景気後退と緊縮財政、南部ア
フリカ地域統合における経済利益の重要性、メディア・納税者の無関心により、SADPA
設置のプロセスは大幅な後れを取っている。他のアフリカ諸国との連帯を重視するア
フリカン・アイデンティティに対する国内のステークホルダーの受け止め方も様々で
あり、政治経済状況によって大きく変動するものとなっている。少なくとも現段階で
は、アフリカン・アイデンティティよりも、援助供与国南アフリカの国益についての
主張がなされることが多くなっている。従って、ステークホルダーのパワーバランス
は、南アフリカの国益を重視するアクターに優位となっており、援助行政の統合が停
滞する原因となっているのである。 
 本ペーパーは、援助行政の統合は、高度に政治的なプロセスによって行われるので
あり、DAC 提言が想定するような非政治的で技術的なプロセスのものではないことを
示唆する。 
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